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Abstract. We propose a new paradigm for software availability enhancement.
We offer a two-step strategy: Failure prediction followed by maintenance
actions with the objective of avoiding impending failures or minimizing the
effort of their repair. For the first step we present two failure prediction
methods: universal basis functions (UBF) and similar events prediction (SEP),
which are based on probabilistic analysis. The potential of the presented
methods   is   evaluated   by   a   case-study   where   failures   of   a   commercial
telecommunication platform have been predicted. The second step includes
existing   maintenance   methods   fitting   the   proposed   approach   and   a  new
recovery strategy called “adaptive recovery blocks”. Since system availability
enhancement is the overall goal, equations to calculate availability of such a
system are given as well.
1 Introduction
Software failures have been identified as the single largest source of unplanned down-
time and system failures (Sullivan et al. [1]). As software is becoming increasingly
complex it also becomes more difficult to manage and is more prone to bugs. Re-
search on software availability issues has largely focused on reducing the number of
errors during software development, e.g., aspect oriented programming or service ori-
ented computing, and on post mortem system repair, aiming at setting the system back
into a fault free state. The disadvantage of the first approach is that it is extremely dif-
ficult if not impossible to build fault-free software. The drawback of the latter is its re-
active approach which makes the system wait for a failure to happen and then reset it
to a fault free state.
In this article we propose a two-step failure prevention and recovery approach. In
the first step the probability of upcoming failures is assessed continuously during run-
time. When a high failure probability has been predicted, in step two either preventive
actions against the potentially upcoming failure are initiated, or reactive mechanisms
are tuned such that time to recovery is shortened. To achieve this, we believe that the
key is to apply machine learning techniques: to observe the system and to learn from
the dynamics of its components in order to infer rules about component interactions
and to correlate the learned rules with failures. These rules may be learned from previ-
ously recorded data: Once we have data describing the evolution of the system we
may build and verify models which would allow us to predict the probability of the
system being in a “healthy” or “failure prone” state.Predicting system failures has been addressed by several authors. For example, a
number of works are on reliability estimation, which inherently yields predictions for
the probability of the next failure's occurrence. These models operate on a very high
level of abstraction and are generated in an analytical manner. An analytical model for
transaction processing systems has been presented by Garg et al. in [2]. Due to aging,
the service rate of the system in question decreases over time and the software itself
experiences hangs and crashes which result in unavailability. The authors present two
preventive maintenance policies which increase the probability that an arriving trans-
action is carried out within a pre-specified response time. However, their analytical
approach, quickly reaches its limits with increasing complexity of systems in practical
use. A continuous time Markov chain model for a long running server-client type
telecommunication system is described by Huang et al. in [3]. They express downtime
and the cost induced by downtime in terms of the models parameters. In [4] the as-
sumption of exponentially distributed time independent transition rates (sojourn time)
made in [3]  are relaxed and a semi-Markov model is built. This way the authors find a
closed form expression for the optimal rejuvenation time. 
In contrast to analytically generated models, a number of models that are built
from previously recorded data have been proposed. Literature on applying linear mod-
eling techniques to software systems has been dominated by approaches based on a
single or a limited number of variables. Most models are either based on observations
of workload, time, memory or file tables. In [5] Garg et al. propose a time based mod-
el for detection of software aging. Vaidyanathan and Trivedi [6] propose a workload
based model for prediction of resource exhaustion in operating systems such as Unix.
Li et al. [7] collect data from a web server which they expose to an artificial workload.
The authors build time series ARMA (autoregressive moving average) models to de-
tect aging and estimate resource exhaustion times. The idea of applying statistical
learning theory to extract models from observed behavior of the system has been de-
scribed more recently by Fox et. al [8]. Little attention has been given to detect poten-
tial nonlinear dependencies between various system resources and impending failures.
In this paper we propose Universal Basis Functions that show the potential to make
headway in this area.
Models operating on event-driven data include, for example, the Dispersion Frame
Technique presented by Lin et al. [9]. Most of these models are based solely on the
time of failure occurrence and do not incorporate additional information such as pat-
terns of error messages or information that is contained in the messages itself. Similar
Events Prediction, which is the second approach to failure prediction proposed in this
paper, exploits this additional data.
The paper is structured as follows: A detailed problem statement is given in Sec-
tion 2. In Section 3 two failure prediction methods are presented while maintenance
and repair procedures are discussed in Section 4. In order to assess the impact on sys-
tem availability equations to calculate availability from five quality measures are de-
scribed in Section 5. In Section 6 a proof-of-concept case-study is presented in which
the  proposed failure prediction techniques have been applied to a commercial
telecommunication platform.2 Problem Statement and Research Challenges
Large industrial software systems can consist of millions of lines of code, with hun-
dreds of programmers working on the system. The system can operate in a distributed
way and there are many techniques in which fault tolerance and performance are
boosted, sometimes in obscure and undocumented ways. The system may consist of
many interacting parts, which may not be well specified. The widespread application
of  commercial-of-the-shelf-components (COTS) further adds to complexity. When
we mention “large” systems we consider the fact that there is typically no single in-
stance with full knowledge of the system's details. 
Currently employed post mortem repair schemes are limited in their scope because
by definition they always need time to identify a failure and they need resources to re-
construct a failure free system state. Consider, for example,  a real-time system in
which if we double system resources and have one system act as a standby, the time
needed to identify a failure, switch over to the standby system, initiate the standby sys-
tem and get the the desired result may well exceed deadline guarantees.  
There is always a trade-off between availability and the resources needed to
achieve it. We believe that in order to gain a significant improvement in system avail-
ability under resource constraints by the order of a magnitude or so, we need a radical-
ly different approach. If we could predict the appearance of a failure in advance and
early enough to initiate preventive measures, we might be able to alleviate the impend-
ing failure, or at least we might be able to prepare recovery for the upcoming failure in
order to reduce resource consumption and time to repair.
However, “there is no free lunch” also holds for software systems. In order to get a
prediction mechanism to work, we need to identify an adequate mechanism, to build a
model of the system and then make correct predictions about impending failures dur-
ing runtime. This procedure requires human as well as computation resources.
2.1 Problem Statement
Our objective is a development of failure prediction methods with high accuracy and a
determination of automatically invoked actions that are effective, efficient and appro-
priate to the situation for industry scale software systems. 
We believe machine learning techniques such as kernel or Markov based mecha-
nisms are two of the most qualified approaches for failure prediction. Given that there
is no way to obtain full knowledge of the system, the only practical way to learn about
it is to “touch and observe” the system by collecting data about its status. This could
include time series about system variables logged in regular time intervals (e.g., mem-
ory consumption or CPU load) as well as event-driven logfile data written by the ap-
plication or the operating system. 
The learning task in our scenario can be defined as follows: Given a set of labeled
observations we compute a probabilistic classifier by a learning algorithm that pre-
dicts the target class label, which is either “failure” or “no failure”. As classifier
mechanism, we employ universal basis functions (UBF) and similar events prediction
(SEP). Both methods are described in Section 3. The classifier needs to evaluate fu-
ture events: If we make a prediction at time t we would like to know the future system
status at time t+t. We call t the lead time (see Figure 1). t is necessary for a pre-diction to be of any use. It critically depends on the problem domain, e.g., how long
does it take to restart a component, to initiate a fail over sequence or any other action.
The prediction period t p describes the length of the time interval for which the predic-
tion holds. It can be adapted more flexibly: The larger t p becomes the easier it is to
predict failures, but the less meaningful the prediction will be. The embedding dimen-
sion t specifies how far the observations used for prediction extend into the past.
Definitions of accurate failure prediction as well as effective and appropriate ac-
tions are given in Section 5.
2.2 Research Challenges
In addition to finding a solution to the objective given in the previous section, there
are other challenges that have to be taken care of. We are interested in a practical way
to increase availability without stressing the system in other parts. Another challenge
is to cope with changing system dynamics, some of it introduced by changing system
configurations, while at the same time keeping performance implications minimal.
Additionally, data collection may introduce unwanted load to the system and the sheer
volume of data collected is a serious challenge for any modeling algorithm. 
Regarding the second step of our approach, open issues include investigation of
actions with respect to their suitability to be combined with failure prediction. Meth-
ods that choose the most effective action depending on failure prediction, system state
as well as other factors have to be developed. Furthermore, the combination of several
failure prediction techniques and maintenance actions seems to be a challenging task.
3 Predicting Failures
The first of our proposed two-step approach is to predict failures. While failures have
to be predicted online – while the system is running – the models used for prediction
are generated off-line by training from previously recorded data. We propose two
models: universal basis functions and similar events prediction and describe the pro-
cess how to derive them.
3.1 Failure Definition
The initial step on the way to failure prediction is to exactly define failures. This is not
a trivial task in a commercial environment. A typical definition is: “A system failure
occurs when the delivered service deviates from fulfilling the system’s function”. It is
important to mention that “system's function” means   behavior from the user’s
Fig. 1. Definition of embedding dimension (t), lead time (t) and prediction period (t p)
t t - t t + t t+t+tp timeperspective. In addition to this definition, probabilistic, real-time and quality-of-
service aspects may also need to be taken into account. For example, in the case study
described in Section 6 a failure is defined as “call failure rate exceeding a predefined
level”. Please note that a failure does not necessarily imply a collapse of the entire
system.
From the modeling perspective failures must meet certain requirements, too. First,
each failure must occur often enough to ensure that the modeling techniques have
enough cases to learn what indicates upcoming failures. It is difficult if not impossible
to identify the exact number of failures needed to build a failure prediction model.
This is an area of ongoing research and currently we strongly depend on the modeler's
intuition developed  in the process of system observation. Further constraints are giv-
en by the fact that it is sometimes not practical to gather data on failures of certain
types in a large software system.   
3.2 Data for Failure Prediction
In our approach, the models for failure prediction are generated by analyzing previ-
ously recorded data in order to extract “symptoms” that indicate an upcoming failure.
Therefore, both failure data and recordings of system variables from which a symptom
can be extracted are needed for model generation – posing conceptual as well as tech-
nical challenges.
Technically, the data should be gathered non-intrusively with minimal implications
on performance. Most software systems are not designed to yield insight information
about their status at any given point in time. Log files have been found to be a feasible
data source for historical system behavior. Issues concerning structure and design of
logfiles have been discussed separately by Salfner et al. [10].
3.3 Variable Selection
An important concern is the selection of system variables that are significant to
achieve good failure prediction. Performance of statistical machine learning models is
closely related to the degrees of freedom in the model, which is strongly influenced by
the number of variables being included in the model. Selecting too few as well as se-
lecting too many variables can lead to poor forecasting performance. See for example
Geman et al. [11]. In a real-world learning problem, the number of variables being
monitored may be in the order of several hundreds, which is comparable to gene se-
quence analysis. There is no a-priori way of determining exactly the importance of
each variable. The set of all observed variables may include noisy, irrelevant or redun-
dant observations distorting the information set gathered. Thus it can be difficult to
determine the most relevant variables with respect to our modeling task beforehand. 
This problem is subject to ongoing research efforts and is known under a variety of
names such as variable selection, dimension reduction or feature detection. It consists
of finding the smallest subset of input variables which are sufficient to perform our
modeling task. This type of problem is one of the most prevalent topics in the machine
learning and pattern recognition community and has been addressed by a number of
authors such as Weigend et al. [12]. Limiting the number of input variables to the onescontributing most to model quality not only decreases the number of free parameters
in our model, the selected variables also can be used to assist an analytical approach in
finding the root cause of a failure. 
3.4 Two Models for Failure Prediction
We briefly describe two models we developed for failure prediction. Both models are
inspired by machine learning techniques since we believe that this class of techniques
is capable to handle the challenges imposed by today's complex software systems. See
Hoffmann [13] for a more detailed description of these models.
Universal Basis Functions. We employ a novel data-based modeling approach we
call Universal Basis Functions (UBF) that was introduced by Hoffmann [14]. UBF is a
kernel based function approximation technique where the probability of a failure at
some prespecified time in the future is estimated. UBF models are a member of the
class of nonlinear non-parametric data-based modeling techniques. They operate with
linear mixtures of bounded and unbounded activation functions such as Gaussian,
sigmoid and multi quadratics  [14][15]. Nonlinear regression techniques strongly
depend on architecture, learning algorithms, initialization heuristics and regularization
techniques and UBF addresses some of these issues. The kernel functions in a UBF
can be adapted to build transfer functions that fit the task of failure prediction making
them robust to noisy data and data with mixtures of bounded and unbounded decision
regions. UBF produce parsimonious models which tend to generalize more efficiently
than comparable approaches such as Radial Basis Functions. To perform online
failure   prediction   we  aim   at   finding   the   correlation   between   availability   and
observable input variables.
Failure Prediction by Similar Events. As UBF is tailored to equidistant time series,
Similar Events Prediction (SEP) analyzes patterns in event-driven datasets [16]. Event
patterns are represented by a discrete Markov chain (see Figure 2-a ). 
During model generation the states are automatically constructed by a hierarchical
clustering technique applied together with additional algorithms to calculate relative
frequencies of paths. 
To achieve failure prediction for the running system that had been modeled, ab-
sorption probability distributions are computed to estimate the probability of a failure
at time t in the future. The result is a discrete probability function as depicted by Fig-
ure 2-b. 4 Actions Fitting Failure Prediction
Obviously, failure prediction alone does not affect availability of a system. Therefore,
after having predicted an upcoming failure an action has to be taken in order to proac-
tively prevent the failure or to optimize its repair. In addition to a discussion of repair
actions and preventive maintenance, a new recovery scheme called adaptive recovery
blocks is introduced.
4.1 Repair Actions
Repairing the system after failure is the classical way of failure handling. These meth-
ods  react  to failures that have already occurred and are triggered by classical
fault/failure detection mechanisms such as, e.g., coding checks, replication checks,
timing checks or plausibility checks.
Roll-backward recovery reestablishes a previous, fault-free system state and tries
to redo computations from that state (either by the same replica to account for tempo-
rary faults or by another hardware and/or software unit). Typical examples are recov-
ery from a checkpoint or recovery blocks. Redo units comprise, for example, spares or
redundant software modules.
Roll-forward recovery skips or approximates faulty computations and continues
with the next – possibly using another computation unit or module. It is mainly used in
real-time environments where meeting deadlines is more important than 100% correct
results. 
Combining reactive recovery methods with failure prediction can reduce mean-
time-to-repair (MTTR). Time-to-repair is characterized by two factors: the time con-
sumed to prepare the unit that performs the redo operation and the amount of opera-
tions that have to be computed again. The latter is mainly determined by the time be-
tween the last checkpoint and the failure's occurrence. Failure prediction has the po-
tential to reduce both: With knowledge of upcoming failures, preparation of redo units
can be started even before the failure occurs and checkpoints may be established short
before failure. For example, in case of spares as redo units, a warm spare could be ele-
vated to become a hot one such that it is almost ready when the failure actually occurs.
(a) (b)
Fig.  2.  Failure prediction with Similar Events Prediction (SEP). (a) Event patterns are
represented as a Markov chain. Each state corresponds to a set of similar events. (b) Failure
prediction is calculation of failure probability at time t in the future.
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there are no redo operations, hence only a quick preparation of computation units im-
proves MTTR.
4.2 Preventive Maintenance
In the context of the approach presented in this article, the goal of preventive mainte-
nance is to perform actions in order to prevent an imminent failure, which has recently
become an active field in research. We identified four categories of mechanisms: pre-
ventive restarts, state clean-up, preventive failover and system relief.
Preventive restarts reset parts of the system or the system as a whole when a fail-
ure is imminent but has not yet occurred. Software Rejuvenation – introduced in 1995
by Huang et al. [3] – is one of the first members of this group. It counteracts the aging
process of software by preventively restarting specific components. Software aging
describes misbehavior of software that does not cause the component to fail immedi-
ately such as, e.g.,  memory leaks and bugs that cannot be completely recovered from.
Rejuvenation is based on the assumption, that restarting a component during normal
operation is more efficient than restarting it after the component has failed.
State clean-up tries to prevent failures by cleaning up resources. Examples are
garbage collection, clearance of queues, correction of corrupt data or elimination of
useless processing. 
Preventive failover techniques perform a preventive switch from a component that
is likely to fail, to another more reliable component. For example, a preventive switch
to a backup unit may be scheduled by failure prediction. Preventive failover can also
include roll-forward techniques. An example for this is a real-time system where an
imminent miss of deadlines (the failure that has been predicted) can be avoided in a
Fig.  3. Improved-Time-To-Repair (TTR) for prediction-driven repair schemes. (a) sketches
classical recovery: Time from the last checkpoint (CP) to the occurrence of a failure (F)
determines how much has to be recomputed (dark-gray interval). After a failure occurs, the
substitution unit has to be initialized (light-gray interval). After repair, the unit is “ready” and
starts to redo the lost computations. When it has finished, the system is “up” again. (b) shows
two effects how failure prediction can reduce TTR: The checkpoint may be established closer
to the failure, and the substituting unit can be initialized even before the failure occurs such
that it is ready earlier after the failure.
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failure predictionroll-forward manner using faster but not 100% accurate methods. A third example is
failure prediction driven load balancing aiming at relief of a component or a system
(See Castelli et al. [17])
System mollification (ease-up) tries to prevent failures by taking load of the system
such that it has the chance to recover. For example, a web-server could reject connec-
tion requests depending on the risk of failure.
Some of the techniques described above can either be scheduled periodically or
system state dependent. For periodic triggering several approaches exist to determine
the optimal cycle duration: For example, Dohi et al. [4] use semi-Markov models,
Pfening et al.  [18]  use a Markov decision process and Garg et al.  [19]  employ a
Markov Regenerative Stochastic Petri Net (MRSPN). Trivedi et al. [20] show that
state-dependent application of proactive recovery mechanisms has the potential to be
more appropriate and hence more effective than the periodic alternative. The case of
failure prediction-based invocation belongs to the class of state-dependent approaches.
Several other techniques exist as well. For example, Vaidynathan et al. [6] use cluster-
ing of several operating system parameters to estimate system workload and to predict
resource exhaustion by use of a semi-Markov process.  
Preventive recovery mechanisms affect Mean-Time-To-Failure (MTTF) since
these methods try only to prevent failures. However, if a failure happens nothing is
done to improve repair. MTTF is affected in two ways: A portion of failures can be
prevented (do not occur) but on the other side some extra failures may be induced.
The incident of an extra failure could, for example, be caused by unnecessary recov-
ery actions performed during peak load periods.
Adaptive Recovery Blocks. Failure prediction enables us to create a new recovery
scheme: Adaptive recovery blocks. Recovery blocks as defined by Randell [21] save
the state at the block's entry (checkpointing) and perform an acceptance test after
computation to check the correctness of the result. Checkpointing produces heavy I/O
traffic while acceptance tests put additional computational load on the system.
Adaptive recovery blocks invest this overhead for reliability only if a failure is likely
to occur whereas in case of low failure probability the overhead can be avoided. See
Figure 4 for illustration.5 Calculating Availability Enhancement
One of the most widespread dependability measures is system availability. To show
the potential of the presented approach, this section gives general equations to calcu-
late the effect on system availability. A short computational example is given in the
last part.
5.1 Measuring the Quality of Failure Prediction and Maintenance Actions
To evaluate the quality of a given failure prediction driven maintenance/repair strategy
we propose five measures: Precision and recall assess the quality of failure prediction
while the effects of maintenance/repair are gauged by three measures: repair time im-
provement, the probability of prohibiting failures as well as the probability of causing
extra ones.
Failure prediction. Several measures exist to account for false positives and false
negatives. We chose  precision  and  recall  that are commonly used in information
retrieval [22]. Precision is defined as the portion how many of the generated alarms
have been correct whereas recall is the portion of true failures that had been predicted:
precision = correctalarms
numberof alarms
(1)
recall = correct alarms
numberof failures
(2)
Both precision and recall can take values in the interval [0,1].
Fig. 4. Comparison of standard recovery blocks (RB) with adaptive recovery blocks (ARB).
Case (a) shows standard recovery blocks: they first perform checkpointing (CP) then the
computation (COMP) and an acceptance test (AT) at the end. Adaptive recovery blocks first
perform failure prediction (FP). (b) If failure probability (PF) is low, checkpointing and
acceptance test can be avoided or limited. (c) shows the case for high failure probability. The
proportion of failure prediction, checkpointing and acceptance test is application specific, but
in many applications checkpointing and acceptance test will outweigh the failure prediction
overhead. 
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(b) ARB  (PF low)Actions. Repair as well as preventive mechanisms that are driven by failure prediction
affect mean-time-to-failure (MTTF) and mean-time-to-repair (MTTR). The effect on
MTTR (see Figure 3) is measured by a repair factor r f being the mean relative im-
provement in MTTR:
r f =
MTTRprep
MTTR
∣ac (3)
where MTTRprep is Mean-time-to-Repair in the case that the repair action was prepared
for the failure (hence the condition of correct alarm ac). r f can take values in [0,∞.
Obviously, a repair factor less than 1 indicates improved MTTR whereas values
greater than 1 imply a change for the worse. In the case of preventive actions  r f
equals 1 since preventive actions do not affect MTTR.
The effect on MTTF is measured by two probabilities: 
P p = PF prevented∣ac (4)
Pe = Pextra failure (5)
PF prevented∣ac denotes the probability that a failure can be prevented by the mainte-
nance procedure in the case that failure prediction identified the upcoming failure cor-
rectly and Pe denotes the probability that an alarm generates an extra (additional) fail-
ure caused by the failure prediction algorithm or the action itself. 
5.2 Calculating Availability
As availability is defined in terms of MTTF and MTTR, we compute MTTF ' and MTTR'
for the system with prediction driven maintenance / repair. From that a formula for
availability is derived. 
MTTR', which is the effective mean-time-to-repair for a system with applied failure
prediction-driven maintenance / repair, is a mixture of MTTR and MTTRprep weighed by
probabilities recall and 1−recall, respectively. Therefore, it can be computed using
Equation 3:
  MTTR' =1recall∗r f−1∗MTTR (6)
In order to compute MTTF ', we first assess the expected number of failures in an
arbitrary time interval [0,t] of the original system without prediction-driven mainte-
nance / repair:
f = t
MTTFMTTR (7)
When applying failure prediction driven maintenance / repair,  f is altered in two
ways: The triggered action may prevent but may also add extra failures:
f ' = f − f prevented  f extra (8)
where the number of prevented / extra failures can be calculated by use of P p and Pe
as follows:
f prevented = P p∗ac (9)f extra = Pe∗a (10)
The number of correct alarms (ac) and the total number of alarms (a) can be calculated
from the number of failures together with precision and recall.
Equation 7 is used to derive an equation for MTTF ': 
MTTF '=
t
f '
− MTTR' (11)
Insertion of Equations 6 and 8 delivers an equation for the mean-time-to-failure:
MTTF ' = MTTFMTTR
1− P p∗recall  Pe∗
recall
precision
−1  recall∗r f−1∗ MTTR
(12)
In order to compute system availability, Equations 6 and 12 have to be combined re-
sulting in the following formula that express effects of our two-step approach – re-
gardless whether it improves or worsens system availability:
A' = A  k∗ MTTR
MTTFMTTR (13)
where A,  MTTF and MTTR characterize the original system and k is:
k = 1 − 1recall∗r f−1∗1−P p∗recallPe∗ recall
precision (14)
In order to guarantee 0A'1, k is bounded:
 k ∈[−MTTF
MTTR
, 1] (15)
5.3 An Example
To get a grasp for the five measures and also to show the potential of the approach, we
provide a short computational example. We chose the values for precision and recall
according to the results achieved for one minute ahead failure predictions in a case
study with a commercial telecommunication application (see next section): preci-
sion = 80%, recall = 92.3%. If we would be able to achieve a prevention probability
P p = 90%, a probability of extra failure Pe = 1% and a repair time improvement factor
r f = 0.5, system availability would be improved by an order of magnitude. Please note,
that the numbers are the same for all order of magnitude transitions, regardless of the
availability of the original system. 
6 Case Study
We applied the two machine learning techniques described in 3.4 to data of a commer-
cial telecommunication platform. It is important to mention that the experiment onlycovers the failure prediction part of our proposed two-step strategy. The second part,
which includes triggering appropriate maintenance / repair actions based on the failure
prediction, is an ongoing research effort. 
To describe the experiment more precisely, the objective was to predict that the
system's failure rate exceeds 0.01% in successive five minute intervals, where a failure
was defined as missing a pre-specified deadline. 
6.1 Platform Characteristics
The main characteristics of the software platform we investigated is its component-
based software architecture running on top of a fully-featured clustering environment
consisting of two to eight nodes. The platform offers the ability to measure response
times and hence to detect failures via an external stress generator. We measured data
of a two node cluster non-intrusively using the Unix SAR (system activity reporter)
tool and logfiles produced by the system.
6.2 Data
We have monitored 53 days of operation over a four month period providing us with
approximately 30GB of data. Results presented in this section originate from a three
days excerpt. We split data of the three days into equally proportioned segments (one
day per segment) and used the first segment to build the models and the second to
cross validate the models. The third segment was used as test data, which had been
kept aside. We gathered the numeric values of 42 operating system variables once per
minute and per node. This yielded 84 variables in a time series describing the evolu-
tion of internal states of the operating system, thus in a 24-hour period we collected
n = 120,960 readings. Logfiles were concurrently collected and the same three days
were selected for modeling and testing. System logfiles contain events of all architec-
tural layers above the cluster management layer. The large variety of logged informa-
tion includes 55 different, partially non-numeric variables in the log files. The amount
of log data per time unit varies greatly: from two to 30,000 log records per hour.
6.3 Results
Using the test data, we calculated precision and recall (see Section 5 for details). We
compared our models to a naive approach that predicts failures periodically with a
period set to mean-time-between-failures calculated from the training and validation
data set. Results are shown in Table 1.The SEP model was built based on a lead time of one minute, the UBF model with
five minutes. Admittedly, this makes it somewhat difficult to compare the results.
However, we expect a smaller lead time to increase the models quality as is demon-
strated by the SEP model. UBF and SEP models clearly outperform the periodic mod-
el that assumes MTBF to remain constant, which is not the case.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
The speed at which complex and large software systems are built and deployed is a
big obstacle to formally define and describe the exact behavior of these systems. We
believe that in order to further significantly increase software availability under given
resource constraints we need to support software systems during runtime. We pro-
posed an approach where preventive maintenance to avoid failures as well as repair
mechanisms are controlled efficiently and appropriately to the system state by failure
prediction. This is in contrast to the currently predominant post-mortem approach that
waits for failures to happen and reacts afterwards.  
For failure prediction, we believe that machine learning techniques that are able to
find relationships in data and to identify suspicious patterns and deviations from nor-
mal behavior, are one of the most promising class of techniques. Inspired by these
techniques we developed two models: Universal Basis Functions (UBF) and Similar
Events Prediction (SEP). Both methods are able to indicate whether or not a system
works but moreover give a probabilistic evaluation on how well the system works. Ad-
ditionally, these models can be powerful tools in understanding the behavior of com-
plex software systems.
We investigated the effectiveness of both techniques to model and predict failures
of a commercial telecommunication system. We compared UBF and SEP to an ap-
proach where failures are “predicted” periodically after Mean-Time-Between-Failure.
Our initial results are encouraging. For UBF we achieve a recall of 82% and a preci-
sion of 49% with 5 minutes lead time while SEP achieves 80% precision and 92% re-
call with 1 minute lead time. Both failure prediction methods compare most favorably
to the MTBF prediction yielding a recall of 20% and a precision of 25%.
Preventive maintenance and repair techniques have been discussed and their effect
on system availability has been investigated. Five quality measures have been identi-
Tab. 1. Precision and recall for Similar-Events-Prediction (SEP), Universal-Basis-Functions
(UBF) and a naive approach using MTBF. In the case of UBF we report mean values. The
reported results were generated on previously unseen test data. 
Model Type of Data Precision Recall Lead Time
SEP log files 0.8000 0.9230 1 min.
UBF SAR  0.4912 0.8295 5 min.
MTBF 0.2500 0.2000 MTTFfied covering all effects on availability: precision and recall evaluate the quality of
failure prediction while the repair time improvement factor, probability of failure pre-
vention and the probability of extra failures assess the outcome of the methods trig-
gered by failure prediction. An equation concerning availability calculation of a sys-
tem that employs such a two-step approach has been derived.
Our two-step approach is embedded in an ongoing research effort, where both fail-
ure prediction methods and preventive and recovery actions are being investigated.
Future work will extend the experiments in terms of increasing the size of the data sets
and assessing the stability of the models (e.g., with changing system configuration).
As our experiments investigated only the first step of our two stage procedure, future
efforts will have to focus on the problem of finding out which recovery scheme is best
suited for which situation and will have to investigate their effectiveness. However,
the ultimate question is: How far can we push the availability increase using our pro-
posed approach - can we expect an improvement of an order of magnitude or more?
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